This application note gives an overview of the use of manufacturing certificates in a Smart Energy network. It also describes the components of a Smart Energy certificate and the differences between test certificates and production certificates. It also explains (with the help of examples) how to use Simplicity Commander to program, verify, and erase Smart Energy certificates from the Silicon Labs Wireless Gecko (EFR32™) portfolio or the EM3xx utilities to perform the same tasks on an EM3x.

Refer to AN1089: Using Installation Codes for Zigbee Devices for how to use Simplicity Commander to program, verify, and erase installation codes with the Silicon Labs Wireless Gecko (EFR32) portfolio.
1. Smart Energy Certificate Overview

Zigbee uses public/private key technology to authenticate a device joining a Smart Energy network and provides a means to securely establish encryption keys for future transactions. The Smart Energy specification uses Elliptical Curve Cryptography (ECC) for cryptographic authentication and key generation.

Zigbee uses ECC with the key establishment cluster to derive a link key. It also uses ECC for creating digital signatures for software upgrade images sent through the Zigbee Over-the-Air (OTA) Upgrade cluster. Certicom (www.certicom.com) provides both the certificates and the ECC technology for use in Zigbee Smart Energy networks.

Smart Energy 1.0 used an ECC curve 163k1 with a 48-byte certificate. Smart Energy 1.2 introduced use of the ECC curve 283k1 with a 74-byte certificate. The certificates are separate and unique and are not interoperable. However when both are present on the same device, they must contain the same 64-bit Extended Unique Identifier (EUI64). Devices may have one or both sets of security data installed. The rules for what devices must have both certificates or what devices only need one certificate is governed by the Smart Energy specification.

Note: While the Silicon Labs Gecko Bootloader also makes use of ECC-based digital authentication with public and private key pairs for authenticating signed firmware images, Smart Energy certificates are not required to use signed images, nor is the Gecko Bootloader required for Zigbee Smart Energy devices. For more information about the Gecko Bootloader and its security features, see UG266: Gecko Bootloader User’s Guide.
2. Security Components

When referring to Smart Energy certificates, there are actually three components that make up the ECC security data contained within a node:

- Certificate
- Static Private Key
- CA Public Key

2.1 Certificate

The first component of the ECC security data is the certificate. This is the device’s EUI64 and static public key, which are signed using the CA’s private key. The certificate is associated with a particular EUI64. As a result, the EUI64 of the device must match the value contained in the certificate.

Although this is part of the security data, it is not secret, and does not need to be handled in the same fashion as the private key. It is transmitted over the air during key establishment.

2.1.1 Smart Energy 1.0 Certificate

Smart Energy 1.0 uses a 48-byte certificate. The following table summarizes the four different fields contained within the certificate body.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field name</th>
<th>Length (bytes)</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Key Reconstruction Data</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Device’s public key signed by the CA’s private key.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Contains the EUI64 associated with the certificate, in big endian format.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issuer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Identity of the CA that issued the certificate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attributes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>An extra set of data associated with the device whose authenticity is guaranteed by the CA. It is not currently used by Zigbee Smart Energy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1.2 Smart Energy 1.2 Certificate

Smart Energy 1.2 uses a 74-byte certificate. The following table summarizes the four different fields contained within the certificate body.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Bytes</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Type of certificate = 0, implicit no extensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SerialNo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Serial Number of the certificate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curve</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Curve identifier (sect283k1 is 13 or byte value 0x0D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hash</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hash identifier (AES-MMO is byte value 0x08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issuer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8-byte identifier, EUI64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ValidFrom</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40-bit Unix time from which the certificate is valid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ValidTo</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32-bit # of seconds from the ValidFrom time for which the certificate is considered valid (0xFFFFFFFF = infinite)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SubjectID</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8-byte identifier, EUI64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KeyUsage</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bit flag indicating key usage (0x88 = digital signature or key agreement allowed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PublicKey</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37-byte compressed public key value from which the public key of the Subject is reconstructed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.2 Static Private Key

The second component of the ECC security data is the static private key. This is a secret piece of data that should be carefully protected. Silicon Labs recommends that during the manufacturing process only those computers that need to know this data to program the device have access to it.

A Smart Energy 1.0 private key is 21 bytes in length. A Smart Energy 1.2 private key is 36 bytes in length.

2.3 CA Public Key

This is the CA’s public key that corresponds to the secret private key held by Certicom. It is used to authenticate certificates received by remote devices and validate the keys derived using the Smart Energy Key Establishment Cluster. While it is not transmitted over the air, it is also public information and does not need to be kept secret.

A Smart Energy 1.0 CA Public Key is 22 bytes in length. A Smart Energy 1.2 CA Public Key is 37 bytes in length.
3. Certificate Authorities

Two Certificate Authorities (CA) are provided by Certicom for use in Smart Energy networks:

- A Test CA that is intended only for use in internal development environments.
- The Production CA that is intended for use in real Smart Energy deployments.

**Note:** Certificates from the Test CA and the Production CA are not compatible.

There are two CAs because developers and installers have different security needs. Developers need to be able to test and debug devices where they will have access to the private keys. Their interests lie in having access to internal data in order to accomplish their goal of writing software. On the other hand, installers want reasonable assurances that a device will not have compromised security data. Their goal is to have a secure installation. Certicom can meet both needs by providing different security for each CA.

3.1 Test CA

Certicom provides a Test CA for quickly and easily generating certificates for use in development units wishing to use ECC. The following link can be used to obtain certificates from the Test CA: [http://www.certicom.com/index.php/gencertregister](http://www.certicom.com/index.php/gencertregister).

Silicon Labs provides two test certificates in their Smart Energy sample application, bound to EUI64 addresses 0022080000000001 and 0022080000000002. These may be used in combination with the Test CA to perform key establishment. They can be found in the supplemental ECC package (available upon request via the Silicon Labs Support Portal’s Software Releases tab) as certicom-test-cert-1.txt and certicom-test-cert-2.txt. The following is the CA Public Key for the Smart Energy 1.0 Test CA:

```
0200FDE8A7F3D1084224962A4E7C54E69AC3F04DA6B8
```

3.2 Production CA

The Production CA is the official CA that is used by all deployed devices. All manufactured devices should contain the Production CA’s public key, and a certificate and private key associated with the Production CA.

The following is the Smart Energy 1.0 Production CA’s Public Key, which should be installed on production devices:

```
0202264C5E4CBFA186A6B925B966B5B3A4D7A390344E
```

Production CAs are obtained through a different mechanism from Test CAs. Because manufacturing involves hundreds or potentially thousands of devices, a different process is used to obtain bulk certificates for a block of EUI64 addresses. In addition, security of the transmission of the private keys is much more important and thus is handled differently from the Test CA.

It is recommended that a manufacturer obtain their own block of EUI64 addresses for production units instead of using each chip’s pre-programmed 64-bit MAC address (EUI64) from Silicon Labs’ address range. Certificates identify a Smart Energy device and its vendor, and a Silicon Labs chip may be used in many Smart Energy deployments. In addition, it is easier to issue certificates for blocks of EUI64 addresses.

Silicon Labs cannot guarantee a set of known EUI64 addresses with a particular set of chips, so it is recommended that the manufacturer install their own to make it easier to manage them. Contact Certicom for more information about obtaining production certificates.
4. Certificate Validation

It is important to note that ECC uses a technology called *implicit certificates*. Traditional SSL certificates used on the Internet contain the unencrypted public key of the device along with a separate signature field that ensures the authenticity of the data. However, with implicit certificates, the two pieces of data are combined together to shrink the size of the certificate for use in embedded devices. This is known as *Public Key Reconstruction* data.

As a result of the combination, it is not possible to verify an implicit certificate without using the certificate as part of the Key Establishment Cluster. Only by performing Key Establishment to derive a link key can a device determine if its certificate is valid.
5. Matching the Components

It is important to note that the four pieces of security data installed for Smart Energy must all match up correctly. The installed certificate must be the correct one for the private key that is also installed. The EUI64 of the device must match the certificate that is installed. Lastly, the certificate must have been issued by the same CA whose public key is installed along with it.

If any of the components is mismatched, the device will never be able to successfully perform key establishment to authenticate itself on a Smart Energy network.

5.1 Manufacturing Test

Silicon Labs recommends that manufacturers validate their process by testing the installed certificate in their first batch of devices. A full test involves successfully joining a Smart Energy network and using the key establishment cluster to derive a link key. The devices in the test should be using Production Certificates issued by the Production CA.

Silicon Labs’ SoC and network coprocessor (NCP) platforms can all store application-specific manufacturing data into an area of flash that can be used to store unique device information. This information is write-once at run-time and is typically programmed via a Serial-Wire or JTAG debug adapter, although some NCP customers prefer to set this data during manufacturing via the EmberZNet Serial Protocol (EZSP). Refer to UG100: EZSP Protocol Reference Guide for information about the available commands for configuring the NCP. Note that some ICs may disallow modification of certain manufacturing data via runtime calls after the Read Protection of flash has already been enabled.

Note: Hard-coding a device’s unique information in source code does not work when using the same application image on multiple devices. The preferred alternative is to have the software read in the device’s unique information from the manufacturing area of flash.
6. Working with Certificates

6.1 Smart Energy 1.0 and 1.2 Certificates

Smart Energy 1.0 used an ECC 163k1 curve with a 48-byte certificate. Smart Energy 1.2 added support for ECC 283k1 curve with a 74-byte certificate. The certificates and the libraries are not interoperable. The Zigbee specification requirements describe what devices must support both certificates and both sets of libraries.

6.2 Overriding the Default EUI64

By default, a EUI64 address from Silicon Labs’ range is pre-programmed into all EM3x and EFR32 chips. Customers may override this by writing their own EUI64 into the Custom EUI64 area of the manufacturing flash.

When programming certificates, the em3xx_load.exe tool (for EM3x-based devices) or Simplicity Commander application (for EFR32-based devices) allows you to override the default EUI64. When a custom EUI64 is already present, the certificate or installation code must use a EUI64 that matches the custom one. See UG107: EM35x Utilities Guide, for more information about using em3xx_load and related EM3x utilities with EM3x chips. See UG162: Simplicity Commander User’s Guide for using Simplicity Commander with EFR32 chips.

If you do not want to override the EUI64, then the certificate must use the Silicon Labs EUI64, and that EUI64 must match what is already programmed on the chip in the TOKEN_MFG Ember_EUI_64 field. The tool prevents overriding EUI64 of the device with another EUI64 from Silicon Labs’ range in order to prevent duplicate EUI64s in the field.

The reason these requirements are in place is to prevent certificates from being programmed on the wrong device. The certificate is bound to the EUI64 of the device and therefore a mismatch will cause problems when deploying an end product.

To program a device with a certificate, the device must be connected via the debug cable to a supported debug adapter, such as the Ember Debug Adapter (also called the ISA3) for EM3x-based devices or the Silicon Labs Debug Adapter Kit (P/N: SLSDA001A) for EFR32-based devices. The tools provided with the EM3x Utilities or Simplicity Commander installation provide the basic elements needed to do this. The tool used for EM3x platforms is em3xx_load.exe, while the tool used for EFR32 platforms is commander.exe. Both are installed as “adapter packs” by Simplicity Studio when you install the part support for the respective chip family.

6.3 Verifying the Software Version on an EM3x

To verify that you have the correct version of the tools, open a command prompt, and change to the directory where the em3xx_load.exe tool is installed. The default for the Simplicity Studio installation of the EM3x Utilities adapter pack is:

C:/SiliconLabs/SimplicityStudio/v4/developer/adapter_packs/em3xx/utils

Note: For installations under Mac OS, the “v4” folder hierarchy will appear within the “Simplicity Studio.app” package.

To verify the software version for the em3xx_load.exe tool, execute the following command:

$ em3xx_load.exe

To support Smart Energy 1.0 certificates, you need to be running at least version 1.0b13:

$ em3xx_load.exe
em3xx_load (Version 1.0b13.125666220)

To support Smart Energy 1.2 certificates, you need to be running at least version 4.1b04:

$ em3xx_load.exe
em3xx_load version 4.1b04
NAME
    em3xx_load - Programming utilities for EM3X series chips
SYNOPSIS
    em3xx_load [TARGET OPTION] [MODIFIERS] COMMAND [COMMAND ARGUMENTS]
6.4 Verifying the Software Version on an EFR32

To verify that you have the correct version of the tools, open a command prompt, and change to the directory where Simplicity Commander is installed. The default for the Simplicity Studio installation of the Simplicity Commander adapter pack is:

C:/SiliconLabs/SimplicityStudio/v4/developer/adapter Packs/commander

**Note:** For installations under Mac OS, the “v4” folder hierarchy will appear within the “Simplicity Studio.app” package.

To verify the software version for Simplicity Commander, execute the following command:

```
$ commander --version
```

You should see output similar to this:

```
Simplicity Commander 0v25p0b267
JLink DLL version: 6.14
EMDLL Version: 0v14p1b246
mbed TLS version: 2.2.0
```
7. Programming the Certificate into an EM3x

7.1 Checking the Node Information

Prior to modifying the certificate it is best to verify there is connectivity with the device to be programmed, and what information is currently stored on the node. To do this, execute the following command:

```
$ em3xx_load.exe --cibtokensprint
```

You should see the following output:

```
$ em3xx_load.exe --cibtokensprint

em3xx_load version 4.1b04
Connecting to ISA via IP address 10.4.176.51
DLL version 1.1.28, compiled Sep 25 2013 13:55:00
SerialWire interface selected
SWJCLK speed is 500kHz
Targeting EM3588

'General' token group
TOKEN_MFG_CIB_OBS [16 byte array]: A55AFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFF
TOKEN_MFG_CUSTOM_VERSION [16-bit integer]: 0xFF00
TOKEN_MFG_CUSTOM_EUI_64 [8 byte array]: FFFFFFFF0000 FFFFFFFF0000
TOKEN_MFG_STRING [16 byte string]: "" (0 of 16 chars) FFFFFFFF0000 FFFFFFFF0000
TOKEN_MFG_MANUFACT_ID [16-bit integer]: 0xFFF0
TOKEN_MFG_PHY_CONFIG [16-bit integer]: 0xFF26
TOKEN_MFG_BOOTLOAD_AES_KEY [16 byte array]: FFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF0000
TOKEN_MFG_EZSP_STORAGE [8 byte array]: FFFFFFFF0000
TOKEN_MFG_OSC24M_BIAS_TRIM [16-bit integer]: 0xFFF0
TOKEN_MFG_SYNTH_FREQ_OFFSET [16-bit integer]: 0xFFF0
TOKEN_MFG_OSC24M_SETTLE_DELAY [16-bit integer]: 0xFFF0
TOKEN_MFG_CCA_THRESHOLD [16-bit integer]: 0xFFF0
TOKEN_MFG_SECURITY_CONFIG [16-bit integer]: 0xFFF0
TOKEN_MFG_SECURE_BOOTLOADER_KEY [16 byte array]: FFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF0000

'Smart Energy CBKE (TOKEN_MFG_CBKE_DATA)' token group
Device Implicit Cert [48 byte array]: FFFFFFFF0000 FFFFFFFF0000 FFFFFFFF0000 FFFFFFFF0000
CA Public Key [22 byte array]: FFFFFFFF0000 FFFFFFFF0000
Device Private Key [21 byte array]: FFFFFFFF0000 FFFFFFFF0000
CBKE Flags [1 byte array]: FF

'Smart Energy Install Code (TOKEN_MFG_INSTALLATION_CODE)' token group Install Code Flags [2 byte array]: FFF
Install Code [16 byte array]: FFFFFFFF0000 FFFFFFFF0000
CRC [16-bit integer]: 0xFFF0

'Smart Energy 1.2 CBKE (TOKEN_MFG_CBKE_283K1_DATA)' token group
Device Implicit Cert (283k1) [74 byte array]: FFFFFF0000 FFFFFFFF0000 FFFFFFFF0000 FFFFFFFF0000 FFFFFFFF0000 FFFFFFFF0000
CA Public Key (283k1) [37 byte array]: FFFFFF0000 FFFFFF0000 FFFFFF0000 FFFFFF0000 FFFFFF0000
Device Private Key (283k1) [36 byte array]: FFFFFFFF0000 FFFFFFFF0000 FFFFFFFF0000
CBKE FLAGS (283k1) [1 byte array]: FF
DONE

Note: The pre-programmed default EUI64 is not shown in this output as it is part of the Silicon Labs-programmed manufacturing data rather than the customer-programmed manufacturing data. To obtain the default EUI64 of a Silicon Labs device, use the following command (adding the appropriate --ip argument for Ethernet-connected adapters).

Executing the following command reads out the default Silicon Labs-programmed EUI64 in least-significant byte (LSB) notation:
For example, the command above produces the following output (indicating a default EUI64 value of 0x000D6F000092E047):

```plaintext
em3xx_load --read @080407A2-080407A9
```

If the custom EUI64 is set to all F's, then the default EUI64 is used. If this value is not all F's, then it is used instead of the default EUI64.

If the data within the Smart Energy token group (certificate, private key, root CA public key, metadata) is set to all F's, then the data is not valid and will not be used by the software.

### 7.2 Format of the Certificate File

**Note:** If programming both a Smart Energy 1.0 and a Smart Energy 1.2 certificate the two files may be combined into one.

#### 7.2.1 Smart Energy 1.0

To program a Smart Energy 1.0 certificate into the tokens, it is necessary to create a simple text file with the security information in it.

The following is the format of that file expected by the `em3xx_load.exe` tool for Smart Energy 1.0 certificates.

- **CA Public Key:** `<hex-string>`
- **Device Implicit Cert:** `<hex-string>`
- **Device Private Key:** `<hex-string>`

The following is a sample certificate file issued by the **Test CA**, for a device with a EUI64 of 0000000000000001 (big endian).

```plaintext
CA Public Key: 0200fde8a7f3d1084224962a4e7c54e69ac3f04da6b8
Device Implicit Cert: 03045f5c8d85ffba3993cb72dcdaa55f00b3e87d6d00000000000001544553545345341010900060
Device Private Key: 00b8a900fcf6e8bfa383b540f2e90ed438395eaa7
```

**Note:** The code line starting with ‘Device Implicit Cert:’ and its value appears in the CA Public Key on a single line, not three lines as represented above.
7.2.2 Smart Energy 1.2

To program a Smart Energy 1.2 certificate into the tokens, it is necessary to create a simple text file with the security information in it.

The following is the format of that file expected by the em3xx_load.exe tool for Smart Energy 1.2 certificates.

| CA Public Key (283k1): <hex-string> |
| Device Implicit Cert (283k1): <hex-string> |
| Device Private Key (283k1): <hex-string> |

The following is a sample certificate file issued by the Test CA, for a device with a EUI64 of 0000000000000001 (big endian).

CA Public Key (283k1): 0207a45022d9f39f49bdc38380026a279e0a179931a3ab28c5c1a1c6b605154db1dfe6752
Device Implicit Cert (283k1): 00602a3c32e55a8acfd0811121341516718005320c3a6ffffffff0000000000000001080201d41887cd727e1953009a11c4b6cd82d3736381bc3707a05b80f01b73d236da359ee9
Device Private Key (283k1): 00071965eeedfa9ad08370fe7dc7b1e7d0940c9f3917a23b232db16a4f2d402ade31a5

Note: The lines with hex data on them are on the same line as the text strings and not on separate lines as shown above.

7.3 Writing the Certificate into the Manufacturing Area

To write the certificate into the manufacturing area, execute the following command:

```
$ em3xx_load.exe --cibtokenspatch sample_cert.txt
```

You should see the following output (Note: This assumes you are programming two certificates):

```
$ em3xx_load.exe --cibtokenspatch sample_cert.txt em3xx_load version 4.1b04
Connecting to ISA via IP address 10.4.176.51
DLL version 1.1.28, compiled Sep 25 2013 13:55:00 SerialWire interface selected
SWJCLK speed is 500kHz Targeting EM3588
Reset Chip
Writing to address 0x0808087E for token 'Device Implicit Cert' Writing to address 0x080808AE for token 'CA Public Key' Writing to address 0x080808C4 for token 'Device Private Key' Writing to address 0x080808D9 for token 'CBKE Flags'
Writing to address 0x0808090E for token 'Device Implicit Cert (283k1)' Writing to address 0x08080958 for token 'CA Public Key (283k1)' Writing to address 0x0808097D for token 'Device Private Key (283k1)' Writing to address 0x080809A1 for token 'CBKE FLAGS (283k1)'
NOTE: Writing Custom EUI64 '0100000000000000' to match certificate. Address 0x08080812.
Create image file Install RAM image Verify RAM image Install Flash image Verify Flash image Run (by toggling nRESET) DONE
```

In addition to writing the certificate, this will update the custom EUI64 so that it matches the data in the certificate. This ensures that there is parity between the data in the certificate and the EUI64 used by the local device for its identity on the network.
7.4 Verifying the Stored Certificate

After writing the certificate, it is best to verify the information by executing the following command:

```
$ ./em3xx_load.exe --cibtokensprint
You should see the following output:
$ ./em3xx_load.exe --cibtokensprint em3xx_load version 4.1b04
Connecting to ISA via IP address 10.4.176.51
DLL version 1.1.28, compiled Sep 25 2013 13:55:00 SerialWire interface selected
SWJCLK speed is 500kHz Targeting EM3588

'General' token group
TOKEN_MFG_CIB_OBS [16 byte array ] : A55AFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
TOKEN_MFG_CUSTOM_VERSION [16-bit integer ] : 0xFFFF
TOKEN_MFG_EUI_64 [8 byte array ] : 0100000000000000
TOKEN_MFG_STRING [16 byte string ] : "" (0 of 16 chars) FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
TOKEN_MFG_BOARD_NAME [16 byte string ] : "" (0 of 16 chars) FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
TOKEN_MFG_MANUF_ID [16-bit integer ] : 0xFFFF
TOKEN_MFG_PHY_CONFIG [16-bit integer ] : 0xFF26
TOKEN_MFG_BOOTLOAD_AES_KEY [16 byte array ] : FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
TOKEN_MFG_EZSP_STORAGE [8 byte array ] : FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
TOKEN_MFG_OSC24M_BIAS_TRIM [16-bit integer ] : 0xFFFF
TOKEN_MFG_SYNTH_FREQ_OFFSET [16-bit integer ] : 0xFFFF
TOKEN_MFG_OSC24M_SETTLE_DELAY [16-bit integer ] : 0xFFFF
TOKEN_MFG_SECURITY_CONFIG [16-bit integer ] : 0xFFFF
TOKEN_MFG_CCA_THRESHOLD [16-bit integer ] : 0xFFFF
TOKEN_MFG_SECURE_BOOTLOADER_KEY [16 byte array ] : FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF

'Smart Energy CBKE (TOKEN_MFG_CBKE_DATA)' token group
Device Implicit Cert [48 byte array ] : 03045DFC8D85FFB 8B3993CB72DDCA95
53545341410109 0006000000000000
CA Public Key [22 byte array ] : 0200FDE8A7F3D108 4224962A4E7C54E6
Device Private Key [21 byte array ] : 00B8A900FCADEBAB BFA383B50FCE9ED
438395EAA7
CBKE Flags [1 byte array ] : 00

'Smart Energy Install Code (TOKEN_MFG_INSTALLATION_CODE)' token group
Install Code Flags [2 byte array ] : FFFF
Install Code [16 byte array ] : FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
CRC [16-bit integer ] : 0xFFFF

'Smart Energy 1.2 CBKE (TOKEN_MFG_CBKE2_283K1_DATA)' token group
Device Implicit Cert (283k1) [74 byte array ] : 0602A3C32E55A6A CFD0D81112131415
16171800S320C3A6 FFFFFFFF00000000
0000001080201D4 D1887CD72E19530
OC9A11C4B6CD82D3 F36381BC3707A05
BF01BD3232D3A5 9EE9
CA Public Key (283k1) [37 byte array ] : 0207A445022DF039 F49BDC38380026A2
7A9E0A179313AB2 8C5CA1C6B605154 DB1DF6752
Device Private Key (283k1) [36 byte array ] : 000071AB965EEEDF A9AD083707D7DC7
B1E7D0940C9F3917 A23B2CDB16AF2D40 2ADE31A5
CBKE FLAGS (283k1) [1 byte array ] : 00
DONE
```
8. Erasing the Certificate on an EM3x

If the wrong device is programmed with a certificate, it is necessary to remove this security data from the device. To erase token data create an erase file listing the token name using !ERASE! as the token data. For example to erase an ECC 163k1 certificate:

CA Public Key: !ERASE!
Device Implicit Cert: !ERASE!
Device Private Key: !ERASE!

To erase an ECC 283k1 certificate:

CA Public Key (283k1): !ERASE!
Device Implicit Cert (283k1): !ERASE!
Device Private Key (283k1): !ERASE!

**Note:** You can erase both certificates simultaneously by putting the above lines in the same file.

To erase a sample certificate, execute this command:

```bash
$ em3xx_load.exe --cibtokenspatch sample_erase_cert.txt
```

You should see the following output:

```
$ em3xx_load.exe --cibtokenspatch sample_erase_cert.txt em3xx_load (Version 1.0b13.1256666220)
Connecting to ISA via USB Device 0
DLL version 1.1.2, compiled Oct 09 2009 14:09:00 SerialWire interface selected
SWJCLK speed is 500kHz Targeting EM3577
Reset Chip
Writing to address 0x0804087E for token 'Device Implicit Cert'
Writing to address 0x080408AE for token 'CA Public Key'
Writing to address 0x080408C4 for token 'Device Private Key'
Writing to address 0x080408D9 for token 'CBE Flags'
NOTE: Writing Custom EUI64 'FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF' to match certificate. Address 0x08040812.
Create image file Install RAM image Verify RAM image
Install Flash image Verify Flash image
Run (by toggling nRESET)
DONE
```
9. Programming the Certificates into an EFR32

9.1 Checking the Node Information

Prior to modifying the certificate it is best to verify there is connectivity with the device to be programmed, and what information is currently stored on the node. The `tokendump` command prints manufacturing token data as key-value pairs. Simplicity Commander supports more than one group of tokens. In this example, the token group named ‘znet’ is used.

```
$ commander tokendump --tokengroup znet
```

You should see the following output:

```
# The token data can be in one of three main forms: byte-array, integer, or string.
# Byte-arrays are a series of hexadecimal numbers of the required length.
# Integers are BIG endian hexadecimal numbers.
# String data is a quoted set of ASCII characters.
# # MFG_EMBER_EUI_64 : A8D417FEFF570B00
# MFG_CUSTOM_VERSION : 0xFFFF
# MFG_EMBER_EUI_64 : FFFFFFFF000000000
# MFG_STRING : ""
# MFG_BOARD_NAME : ""
# MFG_MANUF_ID : 0xFFFF
# MFG_PHY_CONFIG : 0xFFFF
# MFG_SYNTH_FREQ_OFFSET : 0xFFFF
# MFG_CCA_THRESHOLD : 0xFFFF
# MFG_EZSP_STORAGE : FFFFFFFF000000000
# MFG_CTUNE : 0xFFFF
# MFG_XO_TUNE : 0xFFFF
# MFG_LOCKBITS_PLW : 0x000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFF
# MFG_LOCKBITS_CLW0 : 0xFFFFFFFF
# MFG_LOCKBITS_MLW : 0xFFFFFFFF
# MFG_LOCKBITS_ULW : 0xFFFFFFFF
# MFG_LOCKBITS_DLW : 0xFFFFFFFF
# MFG_BOOTLOAD_AES_KEY : FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
# MFG_SECURITY_CONFIG : 0xFFFF
# MFG_ASH_CONFIG[0] : 0xFFFF
# MFG_ASH_CONFIG[1] : 0xFFFF
# MFG_ASH_CONFIG[2] : 0xFFFF
# MFG_ASH_CONFIG[3] : 0xFFFF
# MFG_ASH_CONFIG[4] : 0xFFFF
# MFG_ASH_CONFIG[5] : 0xFFFF
# MFG_ASH_CONFIG[6] : 0xFFFF
# MFG_ASH_CONFIG[7] : 0xFFFF
# MFG_ASH_CONFIG[8] : 0xFFFF
# MFG_ASH_CONFIG[9] : 0xFFFF
# MFG_ASH_CONFIG[10] : 0xFFFF
# MFG_ASH_CONFIG[11] : 0xFFFF
# MFG_ASH_CONFIG[12] : 0xFFFF
# MFG_ASH_CONFIG[13] : 0xFFFF
# MFG_ASH_CONFIG[14] : 0xFFFF
# MFG_ASH_CONFIG[15] : 0xFFFF
# MFG_ASH_CONFIG[16] : 0xFFFF
# MFG_ASH_CONFIG[17] : 0xFFFF
# MFG_ASH_CONFIG[18] : 0xFFFF
# MFG_ASH_CONFIG[19] : 0xFFFF
# MFG_CBKE_DATA (Smart Energy CBKE) token group
# Device Implicit Cert : FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF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"MFG_SECURE_BOOTLOADER_KEY (Manufacture token space for storing secure bootloader key.)' token group
MFG_SECURE_BOOTLOADER_KEY : FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF

"MFG_CBKE_283K1_DATA (Smart Energy 1.2 CBKE)' token group
Device Implicit Cert (283k1) : FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
CA Public Key (283k1) : FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
Device Private Key (283k1) : FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
# CBKE FLAGS (283k1) : 0xFF

"MFG_SIGNED_BOOTLOADER_KEY_X (Manufacture token space for storing ECDSA signed bootloader key (X-point)).' token group
MFG_SIGNED_BOOTLOADER_KEY_X : FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF

"MFG_SIGNED_BOOTLOADER_KEY_Y (Manufacture token space for storing ECDSA signed bootloader key (Y-point)).' token group
MFG_SIGNED_BOOTLOADER_KEY_Y : FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF

DONE

The pre-programmed EU64 is read out by executing the following command.

```
commander tokendump --tokengroup znet --token MFG_EMBER_EUI_64
```

The token data can be in one of three main forms: byte-array, integer, or string.
- Byte-arrays are a series of hexadecimal numbers of the required length.
- Integers are BIG endian hexadecimal numbers.
- String data is a quoted set of ASCII characters.

```
# MFG_EMBER_EUI_64: A8D417FEFF570B00
DONE
```

9.2 Format of the Certificate File

9.2.1 Smart Energy 1.0

Simplicity Commander uses the same text file format as the em3xx_load.exe tool (see section 7.2.1 Smart Energy 1.0). Note, however, that Simplicity Commander does not automatically update the EU64 address of the device automatically, so you must specify this manually in the token file:

```
CA Public Key: 0200fde8a7f3d1084224962a4e7c54e69ac3f04da6b8
Device Implicit Cert: 03045dfdc8d85ff0b8b3993cb72ddc15a510b3e87d6d000000000000000000000015455345343431010900060000000000000000
Device Private Key: 008a900fcadebabbfa383b540f0c9ed438395eaa7
MFG_CUSTOM_EUI_64: 0000000000000001
```

9.2.2 Smart Energy 1.2

Simplicity Commander uses the same text file format as the em3xx_load.exe tool (see section 7.2.2 Smart Energy 1.2). Note, however, that Simplicity Commander does not automatically update the EU64 address of the device automatically, so you must specify this manually in the token file:

```
CA Public Key (283k1): 0207a45022d9f39f49bdc38380026a27a9e0a1799313ab28c5ca1c6b605154db1df6752
Device Implicit Cert (283k1): 00602a3c32e55a8ac60811123134516171805320c3a6ffffff00000000000000001080201d4d1887c727e1953009a11c0b6cd82d3f363b1bc3707a0b8f00b7363d3a59ee9
Device Private Key (283k1): 000071a965eeedfa9ad08370fed7dc7be7d0940c9f3971a23b2c0b3d2402a6e31a5
MFG_CUSTOM_EUI_64: 0000000000000001
```
9.3 Writing the Certificate into the Manufacturing Area

Simplicity Commander does not automatically update the custom EUI64 address to match the certificate, so you need to make sure that these are in sync. This can be accomplished by adding it to the text file with the certificate (sample_cert.txt in the example).

```bash
$ commander flash --tokengroup znet --tokenfile sample_cert.txt
```

You should see the following output:

```plaintext
Writing 2048 bytes starting at address 0x0fe04000
Comparing range 0xFE04000 - 0xFE047FF (2 KB)
Programming range 0xFE04240 - 0xFE0435F (288 Bytes)
Verifying range 0xFE04000 - 0xFE047FF (2 KB)
DONE
```
9.4 Verifying the Stored Certificate

After writing the certificate, it is best to verify the information by executing the following command:

```bash
$ commander tokendump --tokengroup znet
```

You should see the following output:

```
# The token data can be in one of three main forms: byte-array, integer, or string.
# Byte-arrays are a series of hexadecimal numbers of the required length.
# Integers are BIG endian hexadecimal numbers.
# String data is a quoted set of ASCII characters.
#
# MFG_EMBER_EUI_64     : E33409FEFF570B00
MFG_CUSTOM_VERSION   : 0xFFFF
MFG_CUSTOM_EUI_64    : FFFFFFFF
MFG_STRING           : ""
MFG_MANUF_ID         : 0xFFFF
MFG_PHY_CONFIG       : 0xFFFF
MFG_SYNTH_FREQ_OFFSET: 0xFFFF
MFG_CCA_THRESHOLD    : 0xFFFF
MFG_EZSP_STORAGE     : FFFFFFFF
MFG_CTUNE            : 0x7BF0
MFG_XO_TUNE          : 0xFFFF
MFG_LOCKBITS_PLW     : 0x000000000000000000000000FFFFFFFF
MFG_LOCKBITS_CLW0    : 0xFFFFFFFF
MFG_LOCKBITS_MLW     : 0xFFFFFFFF
MFG_LOCKBITS_ULW     : 0xFFFFFFFF
MFG_LOCKBITS_DLW     : 0xFFFFFFFF
MFG_BOOTLOAD_AES_KEY : FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
MFG_SECURITY_CONFIG  : 0xFFFF
MFG_ASH_CONFIG[0]    : 0xFFFF
MFG_ASH_CONFIG[1]    : 0xFFFF
MFG_ASH_CONFIG[2]    : 0xFFFF
MFG_ASH_CONFIG[3]    : 0xFFFF
MFG_ASH_CONFIG[4]    : 0xFFFF
MFG_ASH_CONFIG[5]    : 0xFFFF
MFG_ASH_CONFIG[6]    : 0xFFFF
MFG_ASH_CONFIG[7]    : 0xFFFF
MFG_ASH_CONFIG[8]    : 0xFFFF
MFG_ASH_CONFIG[9]    : 0xFFFF
MFG_ASH_CONFIG[10]   : 0xFFFF
MFG_ASH_CONFIG[11]   : 0xFFFF
MFG_ASH_CONFIG[12]   : 0xFFFF
MFG_ASH_CONFIG[13]   : 0xFFFF
MFG_ASH_CONFIG[14]   : 0xFFFF
MFG_ASH_CONFIG[15]   : 0xFFFF
MFG_ASH_CONFIG[16]   : 0xFFFF
MFG_ASH_CONFIG[17]   : 0xFFFF
MFG_ASH_CONFIG[18]   : 0xFFFF
MFG_ASH_CONFIG[19]   : 0xFFFF
```
D1887CD727E195300C9A11C4B6CD82D37F36381BC3707A05B8F01B73D236D3A59EE9
CA Public Key (283k1) : 0207A445022D9F39F49BDC38380026A27A9E0A1799313AB28C51A1C6B605154DB1DFF6752
Device Private Key (283k1) : 000071AB965EEEDFA9AD08370FED7DCE7D0940C9F3917A23B2CDB16AFD2402A8E31A5
# CBKE FLAGS (283k1) : 0x00

#'MFG_SIGNED_BOOTLOADER_KEY_X (Manufacture token space for storing ECDSA signed bootloader key (X-point).)' token group
MFG_SIGNED_BOOTLOADER_KEY_X : FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF

#'MFG_SIGNED_BOOTLOADER_KEY_Y (Manufacture token space for storing ECDSA signed bootloader key (Y-point).)' token group
MFG_SIGNED_BOOTLOADER_KEY_Y : FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF

DONE
10. Erasing the Certificate on an EFR32

If the wrong device is programmed with a certificate, or it is necessary to remove this security data from the device. See section 8. Erasing the Certificate on an EM3x, for more information on the contents of the sample_erase_cert.txt file. To erase a certificate, execute this command:

```
$ commander flash --tokenfile sample_erase_cert.txt --tokengroup znet
```

You should see the following output:

```
Writing 2048 bytes starting at address 0x0fe04000
Comparing range 0x0FE04000 - 0x0FE047FF (2 KB)
Erasing range 0x0FE04240 - 0x0FE0435F (288 Bytes)
Verifying range 0x0FE04000 - 0x0FE047FF (2 KB)
DONE
```
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